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Abstract 
 
   
In the context of reduced violence world-wide, as documented by Pinker (2011), Islam is an 
exception; i.e., it is more violent than other cultures. Can contemporary cultural psychology explain 
aspects of this difference? It is hypothesized that violence is more frequent in cultures that are 
vertical collectivist than in cultures that are horizontal individualist. The paper reviews data that are 
generally consistent with this hypothesis. Furthermore, most Muslims are not violent, but perhaps 1 
percent do engage in jihad. What personality aspects might explain this difference? It is argued that 
self-deception is very common among humans and the jihadists are especially susceptible to self-
deception. Religion provides important benefits but it is also often related to violence.  One way to 
reduce aspects of Islamic violence is for the West to ridicule Islam less. The paper also provides 
Islam with a more realistic model of its religion.   
 
 
Key words: Violence, Culture, Collectivism, Individualism, Religion, Islam. 
 
 
Entendiendo la violencia en el Islam 
 
Resumen 
 
En el contexto de reducción mundial de la violencia, tal como lo documenta Pinker (2011), 
el Islam es una excepción p.e., es más violento que otras culturas. ¿Es posible que la psicología 
cultural actual explique los aspectos de dicha diferencia? Se hipotetiza que la violencia es más 
frecuente en culturas que son colectivistas verticales que en culturas que son individualistas 
horizontales. Este trabajo revisa datos que son generalmente consistentes con la ya mencionada 
hipótesis. Además, la mayoría de los islámicos no son violentos, aunque tal vez el 1 por ciento de 
ellos sean partícipes del jihad. ¿Qué aspectos de la personalidad podrían explicar esta diferencia? 
Se argumenta que el auto-engaño es bastante común entre los seres humanos, y que los jihadas 
son especialmente susceptibles al auto-engaño. La religión provee beneficios importantes pero 
también es comúnmente asociada con la violencia. Una manera de reducir aspectos de la violencia 
islámica es que el oeste haga menos ridiculizaciones del Islam. Este trabajo también describe al 
Islam con un modelo más realista de su religión. 
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While there is violence in most parts of the world, some parts are more violent 
than others. People often believe that Islam is violent because of what they read in 
their newspapers, often forgetting that religions on both sides may have instigated 
the violence. They see violence in Palestine (Jews v Muslims), the Balkans 
(Orthodox Serbians v   Catholic Croats, Orthodox Serbians v Bosnian and Albania 
Muslims), Kashmir (Muslims v Hindus), Sudan (Muslims v Christians  and animists), 
Nigeria (Muslims v Christians), Iran, Iraq and Pakistan (Shiah v Sunni),     Indonesia 
(Muslims v Christians), Chechnya and the Philippines (Muslim insurrection). Recent 
events are remembered better. Thus the terrorism in America, Indonesia, Britain, 
and Spain, and the March 22, 2012, event in Toulouse, France, where Mohamed 
Marah, who had killed seven people, jumped out of a window stating that he did not 
fear death because he was “going to paradise” are remembered well.  
There is also some evidence that Muslims are more ready to fight than are 
other groups. A study by Liu et al. (2012) had data from 5800 students from 30 
cultures. One item used by Liu et al. was “willingness to fight for one’s own country.” 
The countries that were “high” on this measure included Malaysia, Tunisia and 
Indonesia (the three predominantly Muslim countries in the sample of 30). Low were 
Switzerland and Italy (p.267).  Of course, this finding can also be interpreted in non-
religious ways: in these countries people are more “patriotic.” 
Religious intolerance has become an increasingly serious problem in 
Indonesia, one of Islam’s less fundamentalist countries. The Economist (June 9-15, 
2012) has reported Muslim mob attacks of Christian churches, and even Muslim 
sects, such as the Ahmediyah, which the Islamic hardliners consider heretical.  
Can our current understanding of cultural psychological differences provide 
some clues about the difference between countries that are high or low in 
interreligious violence? 
 Most of the instances of violence mentioned above are related to religion. 
There are two kinds of religions: external and internal (Triandis, 2009b). The 
external assume the existence of supernatural beings. The internal focus on what 
happens inside persons. The outstanding examples of internal religions are original 
Buddhism, where the internal struggle is to reach nirvana, and the versions of Islam 
that focus on the little jihad, which concerns cleaning oneself from sins and 
controlling oneself. In this paper when Islam is mentioned it refers to the external 
religion. All external religions are related to violence (Pinker, 2011), but this paper 
focuses only on Islam, in order to limit its length. 
In this essay, after some preliminary comments, I will review some major 
ways in which cultures are different from each other, and then compare Islamic 
cultures to these patterns of differences. I will finally suggest ways to de-escalate the 
violence in Islamic cultures. 
 
Some Preliminary Considerations 
Many conflicts appear related to fundamentalist religion, especially certain 
aspects of Islam.  Yet most Muslims oppose violence (Gabriel, 2006), and their 
very way of greeting each other, “Peace be with you,” suggests that they value 
peace. 
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Islam is enormously heterogeneous (Allawi, 2009; Esposito, 2003; Triandis, 
2009b). For example, the Egyptian Imam accepted suicide bombings while the 
Imam in Saudi Arabia condemned them (Esposito, 2003).  Muslims disagreed 
about the destruction of the Buddhist statues in Bamyan, Afghanistan.  Some 
agreed and others condemned this act (Allawi, 2009).  
In the 1950s Islam was more modern than in the 1970s (Allawi, 2009). 
According to Ali A. Allawi, a historian of the intellectual life of Islam, the 
transformational event was the Arab-Israeli war of 1967. The loss of the war led to 
questioning of whether “more modernity” or “more Islam” was the right answer for 
the future. More Islam won. A National Public TV Program (5/22/12) explored the 
differences between the rich West and the poor Rest, and concluded that the key 
factor was science and technology. Those cultures that emphasized Islam were 
poor, unless they had oil. On the other hand Turkey after Kemal Atatὕrk became 
relatively prosperous. Thus apparently more Islam was not the right solution. It is 
notable that in the Egyptian elections of 2012 many voters advocated Shariah law, 
which will result in less investment from abroad, and therefore to a lower gross 
national product.  
The wealth of Saudi Arabia and its link to Wahabi thought has resulted in the 
establishment of many madrassas (schools) around the world that teach about the 
injuries that Muslims have suffered at the hands of Westerners and the need for 
revenge. The schools also provide military training (Triandis, 2009b). As a result 
violence has increased.  
 Islam ranges from al-Qaeda to mystical Sufism. i.e., from extreme violence 
to no violence. The overwhelming Muslim majority is against violence (Gabriel, 
2006) but is intimidated by the few who advocate jihad.  
The ferocity of the war between the Shiah and Sunni factions is notable. 
Consider what happens in Iraq in 2012. Triandis (2009b) quotes some Sunnis who 
say that the Shiah are “infidels” and vice versa. Such statements indicate extreme 
cognitive simplicity, dogmatism, and a black or white cognitive style (Rokeach, 
1960). However, fundamentalists of all religions have this cognitive style (Triandis, 
2009b). 
According to Gonzalez (2009), three factors help to explain the Shiah-Sunni 
conflict.   
1) The Middle East can be characterized as a set of tribal societies where 
charismatic leaders, sometimes proclaiming that they are a Messiah, rule. They 
often harbor revenge tendencies toward other in-groups. Violence is endemic, 
and reflects old grudges, unresolved previous conflicts, and prejudices. There is 
extreme loyalty to the in-group with rejection of the out-group.  In some cases, 
individuals only have one trade: “fighting.” The conflict starts because the 
leaders wish to have more power, but they make it legitimate in the eyes of their 
followers by casting it as a difference of religious dogma.  
2) There are no powerful states that can impose law-and-order on the previously 
mentioned fighting. Pinker (2011) has found that a powerful state that 
emphasizes law-and-order is one of the major ways to reduce violence. 
3) In that part of the world the animosities of the war-lords are increased by the 
support they receive from powerful states. Support goes back 2500 years, to 
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the conflict between Persia and the Roman Empire; a conflict which became 
the conflict between Shiah Iran  and Sunni Egypt, Saudi  Arabia, and present 
day Lebanon. The Shiah-Sunni conflict started in the 7th Century, as a war in 
Iraq, over the succession to the leadership of the Prophet Mohammad, and has 
continued in various forms ever since. 
 
A reconciliation conference of Sunni and Shiah, sponsored by Jordan, and 
supported by all the relevant states, resulted in 2005 in the “Amman Message” 
which lasted only two years. When al-Qaeda blew up a Shiah shrine, the fighting 
started all over again (Allawi, 2009). 
Dissatisfaction with the government, as found in the Arab Spring of 2011-
2012, has resulted in many deaths. There is great dissatisfaction with the 
government in Southern Europe, but the number of deaths is small. This difference 
is no doubt due to dictatorships vs. democracies, but one may wonder if some of 
the variance is also due to the trigger happy inclinations of the Arabs.   
What factors can account for so much more violence in parts of Islam than 
in other parts of the world?  In this essay the general picture about violence, as 
described by Pinker (2011), will provide the background, then more specific factors 
related to culture will be examined. Finally, the cultures of Islam will be examined in 
relation to the previous discussion.  
The author’s perspectives are based on an examination of common values 
found around the world. In almost all cultures people value (1) health (both physical 
and mental), (2) happiness, (3) longevity, and (4) the non-destruction of the 
environment (Triandis, 2009b). Peace is consistent with these four criteria, while 
violence works against every one of them. 
 
 
In Worldwide Perspective Violence is Declining 
Pinker (2011) presents an impressive data-set that indicates that violence is 
declining. In the past 10,000 years, as we moved from hunter / gatherers to 
information societies, violence has decreased on many fronts. Over the centuries, 
there is less violence toward minorities, women, children, homosexuals, and 
animals. Non-state societies, such as hunter / gatherers, average 524 homicides 
per 100,000 per year. In modern societies this statistic is close to 1/100,000/year. 
Pinker credits powerful states that are concerned with law-and-order, increases in 
commerce, the feminization of the population (males age 15-30 commit most 
homicides; societies that abort female babies have more violence than those that 
give equal rights to women), the expanding circle (paying attention to the welfare of 
those beyond the family, own village, own country to events around the world; 
feeling close to diverse others and feeling guilty when one hurts others; Increased 
literacy, urbanization, mobility, access to the mass media), and the increased use 
of reason (less superstition, less use of fantasies, more concern with reality; 
emphasis on human rights). Over time there is more empathy, more self-control, 
more use of a moral sense; and more respect for others, especially for women by 
men.   
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Pinker shows that there is more violence in poor countries, among the lower 
social classes, and in segments of the population that are impolite. For example, 
the average homicide rate in the world is about 6/100,000/year, but in Japan, 
where harmony and politeness are very important, it is 2.2/100,000/year.   
Religions have long been involved in violence. The Bible describes 1.2 
million deaths. About 1 million people were killed between 1095 and 1208, when 
the Crusaders attacked the Muslims. This was, when taking into account the 
number of people on earth at the time, as lethal as the Nazi Holocaust. The 
Inquisition killed 350,000 people. The Wars of Religion in the 17th Century killed 6 
million. Taking into account the size of the population at that time, the number of 
deaths was proportionally as high in the 17th century as in the 20th, with its two 
World Wars. These were the two most violent periods in human history. Allawi 
(2009) proudly points out that Islam has not killed millions the way the Wars of 
Religion did. 
The jihadists of Islam present a strong contrast to the reduced violence 
described by Pinker. Mark A. Gabriel (2006), an Egyptian with a doctorate in 
Islamic studies from a Cairo University, who lives in the USA, describes the 
terrorist mind as one of extreme cognitive simplicity, prejudice, and opposition to 
every peace plan around the world. The U.N. Declaration of Human Rights was 
considered “unIslamic” by bin-Laden, because it considers all religions as equally 
valid. According to bin-Laden only Islam, of his specific sect of Islam, is valid.  The 
jihadists wish to impose Shariah law on the whole world, and nothing short of that 
will satisfy them.  
The intellectual debates between the jihadists and most Muslims, as 
discussed by Gabriel, contrast sharply with the modern debates in the West. In 
Islam there is no doubt that Allah exists. He is totally anthropomorphic. Such 
debates as “Is God dead?” (Friedrich Nietzsche) are rare in Islam, which is based 
on human-made fantasies about probably non-existing entities (Triandis, 2009b), 
such as Allah, angels, devils, and paradise. The highest values in most Islam are 
conquest of lands (Lewis, 2003) and, at least among a minority of Muslims, the 
imposition of Shariah law. Once this is achieved it is argued that paradise will 
prevail on earth. It is most unfortunate that such unsophisticated thinking is causing 
so much violence.    
The perspective of the majority in Islam, as discussed by Lewis (2003) and 
Esposito (2003), is entirely devoid of multiculturalism, i.e. it is totally Islamocentric. 
However, there are some exceptions, such as Anwar Ibrahim in Malaysia, 
Mohammad Katami in Iran, and Aburrahman Wahid in Indonesia, who advocated 
democracy, pluralism and tolerance for other cultures (for details see Esposito, 
2003).  
The instigators of violence in Islam use human-made hypothetical constructs 
about probably non-existing entities, to motivate naïve Muslems to commit violent 
acts, including suicide. This system has worked well from the beginning of Islam 
since it helped Islam subjugate North Africa, Spain, the Balkans, and other parts of 
the world. A model for this system was provided by the Prophet Muhammad 
himself at the battle of Badr, in 624 CE, when some 300 of his followers won a 
battle against some 900 Meccans. He told his followers that a thousand angels 
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would  come to their aid  during the battle, and if they fought  well  they would go to 
paradise but if they didn’t they would go to hell. It worked! One can assume that a 
miracle was involved, but we know from studies by industrial engineers that it is 
possible to triple the productivity of workers with effective motivation (see Triandis 
2009b for more details). 
 
 
In the Context of Declining Violence Worldwide Islamic Majority Countries   
are an Exception 
What factors might account for this exception? Islam means submission. 
That is cognitively simple, and may predispose believers to a cognitively simple 
world view. Cognitive simplicity is the major attribute of fundamentalism (Triandis, 
2009b).  Fundamentalism is related to violence (see Triandis, 2009b for details). 
 
 
Culture and Violence 
Contemporary cross-cultural psychology (Kitayama & Cohen, 2007, Markus 
& Kitayama, 1991; Triandis, 1989, 1994, 1995, 2009a, 2009b, Triandis & Gelfand, 
2012) emphasizes the contrast between collectivist and individualist cultures.  
Hundreds of publications have used this contrast. However, three other dimensions 
have also proven important: 
1. Cultural simplicity (as found among hunters and gatherers) v cultural 
complexity (as found in information societies) (Chick, 1997). 
2. Cultural tightness v cultural looseness (Gelfand et al., 2011; Pelto, 1968; 
Triandis, 1994). Cultures with many norms imposed tightly (e.g., if one does 
not do what is expected one is killed) v imposed loosely (e.g., if one does 
not do what is expected people smile). Examples: Taliban v rural Thailand. 
3. Vertical (highly hierarchical) v Horizontal (less hierarchical) cultures.  
 
Triandis (1995) used four attributes to define collectivism.  
a) collectivists define the self by using some collective, such as family village,  
religion. Muslims think of themselves as Muslims more frequently than they 
think of themselves as having other attributes (Allawi, 2009). This was probably 
also true of members of other religions in the past, but contemporary samples 
usually do not mention their religion.  
b) Collectivists give priority to the goals of the in-group rather than their personal 
goals. Thus, it is understandable that suicide bombers blow themselves up “for 
the good of Islam” and do not think of themselves as worthy of a long life, 
though the instigators of suicide bombing promise them paradise, so there 
maybe  some consistency between the goals of the collective and the 
individual. 
c) The behavior of collectivists is determined by group norms rather than personal 
attitudes. Thus, when individuals come from a collectivist culture and the 
authorities of their in-group urge them “to sacrifice for Allah,” that can take 
priority over personal attitudes. However, the promises given to those who blow 
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themselves up also may play a role. One of them said: “I know my life is poor 
compared to Europe and America, but I have something awaiting me that 
makes all my suffering worthwhile. Most boys can’t stop thinking about the 
virgins.”(Stern, 2003, p. 55)  One suicide bomber, whose attack was prevented, 
had wrapped toilet paper around his genitals to protect them for later use in 
paradise (Stern, 2003).  
d) When collectivists do not like their group, they tend to stay with it, rather than 
look for another group. Thus, even when Muslims do not like Islam they do not 
leave it. This tendency is made even stronger because leaving Islam is 
“apostasy” and is punished by death. 
 
There are many kinds of collectivism and individualism, the most important 
being the vertical (V) v horizontal (H) varieties (Shavitt, Torelli, & Riemer, 2011; 
Triandis, 1995; Triandis & Gelfand, 1998).   
The correlates of simplicity-complexity are primarily ecological (Triandis 
2009a). Especially important is the size of the population settlement.  Simple 
cultures consist of bands of 50 to 200 individuals, while complex societies have 
millions of members. The death rates in Pinker’s (2011) report in simple cultures 
are 13.4% per year, while in the complex cultures they are 2.7%.  
It is reasonable to assume that cognitive simplicity and cultural simplicity are 
related. In the case of violence, revenge is a good example of cognitive simplicity.  
The discovery of win-win solutions requires cognitive complexity. Another example 
is the thought “those who belong to group X must be killed.” The history of the 
Shiah-Sunni conflict, described by Gonzalez (2009), is replete with such thinking.  
Gelfand et al., (2011) found that tightness is correlated with population 
density, scarcity of resources, terrorism, natural disasters, disease, great 
religiosity, autocracy, close monitoring of social behavior, many prohibitions, and 
censorship. Pelto (1968) used the legitimate use of force as one characteristic of 
tight cultures.  While Pinker does not discuss tightness-looseness it is safe to 
assume that tightness, such as found in the Taliban, is associated with more 
violence than looseness, as found in rural Thailand.  
The different kinds of collectivism and individualism result in four kinds of 
societies: VC (Vertical Collectivist), HC (Horizontal Collectivist), VI (Vertical 
Individualist), and HI (Horizontal Individualist). The VC pattern is found in most 
traditional societies, such as rural China or India. The major value is conformity to 
the authorities. Bond and Smith (1996) found more conformity in collectivist 
cultures, as measured by the Asch paradigm, than in individualist cultures. 
Domestic violence is higher in collectivist cultures (e.g., Egypt, 78%) than in 
individualist cultures (e.g., New Zealand, 1%).  Domestic violence is against the 
law in Western Europe (in 84 % of the countries), but not as much in the Arab 
countries where it is against the law only in 25% of them. Violence tends to be high 
in collectivist societies, primarily because these societies are poor, and poverty is 
related to violence (Pinker, 2011). There is less violence in more literate societies 
because greater value is placed on the life of the more educated than on the life of 
less educated individuals.  
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The HC pattern is found in the Israeli kibbutz. The major value is 
cooperation. Violence is generally low in such societies.  The VI pattern is found in 
academia and major corporations, where achievement and competition are the 
important values. Competition often results in violence so that these cultures are 
moderately violent.  The HI pattern is found in Scandinavia, Australia, and New 
Zealand where the major value is the uniqueness of the individual (Triandis and 
Gelfand, 1998, 2012). There is very little violence in such societies. Affluence and 
globalization tends to shift cultures from VC to HI.  Thus, violence is high in VC 
cultures and lower in VI, HC and HI cultures in that order. In short, it appears that 
societies where hierarchy is very important are more violent than societies where it 
is relatively unimportant (see also Liu et al., 2012, p. 254). 
 
 
Are the Cultures of Islam More Violent than Other Cultures? 
Gregory Davis (2006) argues that Islam is a military-political world view. He 
claims that the “sacred” books of Islam present the “House of Islam” (the believers) 
and the “House of War” (the non-believers), and it is the obligation of all believers 
to fight the non-believers until they submit to Allah, and adopt Shariah law. 
Davis’ book is scholarly, but he pays too much attention to the “sacred” 
texts. It is probable that 99 percent of Muslims go about their everyday business 
without thinking of the “sacred” texts, or feeling the obligation to establish Shariah 
law throughout the world. Consider the case of the Christians. Their “sacred” texts 
tell that it is easier for a poor rather than a rich person to enter paradise (Mark 10, 
25). How many Christians try to be poor? In fact, some Christians believe that if 
one is rich that is a clue that one has been chosen by God to go to paradise!  In 
short, religions provide a complex set of stimuli, and believers sample only some of 
them. But there may be one percent of Muslims who do sample the violent aspects 
of the “sacred” books. 
In one case Davis is correct. The sacred texts of Islam are consistent with 
the “Manual for the Raid” that was found in the luggage of Mohammed Atta, the 
chief terrorist of the 9/11/01 events, as reported in the New York Times. This 
manual stated that the 9/11/01 events were “God’s work.” Atta was doing “God’s 
work” as defined in some of the Islamic “sacred” texts.  
Thus, the key issue for us is to tell the difference between the probable 
ninety-nine percent of Muslims who are not terrorists and the one percent who are. 
 
 
Self-deception 
Humans have a strong tendency toward self-deception (Triandis, 2009b).  
Some humans use more self-deceptions than others, and we can expect that those 
who use many self-deceptions will be part of the 1 percent and will engage in jihad. 
Self-deception occurs when humans use their hopes, needs, desires, ideology, 
theory, prejudices, habits, stereotypes, sacred values and other psychological 
processes to construct the way we see the world (Triandis, 2009b).  The insight 
that we have self-deceptions when we use psychological processes to construct 
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the way we see the world, goes back to the Buddha, about 2500 years ago, who 
said : “Where self is, truth is not; where truth is, self is not.” 
Self-deceptions are ubiquitous. Almost every human creation, including this 
essay, includes traces of self-deception. The question is how much self-deception 
is included. Even in science, when we state a hypothesis we use our hopes needs 
and desires that it will be supported!  
Bin-Laden stated that someday the whole world will become Islamic 
(Triandis, 2009b). This was probably consistent with his hopes, needs, and 
desires, and is clearly a monumental oversimplification, making it a cognitively 
simple self-deception. How many of the 1 percent have similar self-deceptions?   
In any case the fantasy that the whole world will adopt Shariah law is a self-
deception and since that fantasy is probably common among the 1 percent of 
Muslims who engage in jihad we can assume that self-deception is one important 
factor distinguishing the 1 percent from the 99 percent.   
As suggested above, self-deceptions tend to be cognitively simple. Triandis 
(2009b) examined over one hundred historical self-deceptions and found that most 
of them were cognitively simple. For example, when the French Revolution started, 
in 1789 with the Fall of the Bastille, the King of France, Louis XVI, wrote one word 
in his diary: “Nothing.”  Of course, it was consistent with his hopes, needs, and 
desires that nothing happened, but it is amazing that the initiation of one of the 
greatest events of world history was seen so simply as something deserving no 
comment. 
Another attribute of many self-deceptions is megalomania. The following 
example illustrates this.  
The Norwegian nationalist Anders Breivik, who killed 77 people in the 
summer of 2011 to protest Norwegian multiculturalism, provides a good example of 
self-deception.  He sees the world according to his ideology. Presumably it was his 
hope, need, and desire that Norway would change its policy. He is obviously 
cognitively simple when thinking that he can change Norway’s policy with this one 
act. Psychiatrists disagreed concerning his mental state. Some saw him as 
schizophrenic, others as just a strong ideologue. Probably the latter are correct. In 
his court testimony he stated that his act “was the greatest event in Europe since 
World War II.” This statement reveals his megalomania.  He apparently forgot 
Yugoslavia, the creation of the European Union, the end of the Cold War and other 
events. 
However, in rare cases self-deception is related to feeling that the self is 
insignificant. The extreme example of this case is Gandhi. He was certainly “a 
great soul,” as they call him in India, and an important player in the achievement of 
Indian independence, yet he felt that his career was based on an illusion (Lelyveid, 
2011, p. 325). His self-deception was that the differences between Hindus and 
Moslems, the Brahmins and the untouchables could be ignored, and a unified India 
could result. This was certainly consistent with his hopes, needs and desires, but 
reality was very different, resulting in a partition of the country that was associated 
with an estimated 700,000 to one million deaths and about 10 million refugees 
(Muslims crossing into Pakistan or Hindus crossing into India). 
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Triandis (2009b) attempted to present the world without self-deceptions. He 
argued that we humans are products of random evolutionary processes in a vast 
universe, and we should try to become cozy on this planet by helping as many 
people as possible, the whole of humanity if possible, to reach good health, 
happiness, longevity and the non-destruction of the environment. This view 
condemns violence, but the 1 percent glorifies it. 
 
 
Factors that Increase Violence 
Some people join jihad because of personal factors. For example, the BBC 
(on 9/13/11) carried a report about two brothers from Pakistan.  The younger 
brother decided to join the jihad, to do Allah’s work, but the older brother, who was 
the head of the family objected. The older brother was able to go to the training 
camp of the younger brother and convince him to return home, with the argument 
that their mother was very sick and wanted to see him. The older brother attributed 
the decision of the younger brother to join the jihad to the fact that he was not a 
good student in school and had failed in business. In short, the jihad was an 
escape from reality. He said: “We are all good Muslims, doing our prayers, but 
jihad is extremist.” 
A report on NPR (on 4/26/12) mentioned a Pakistani woman who is 
mobilizing mothers to talk to their sons and convince them not to join the jihad. 
However, one of the problems is money. Joining often means that the son is 
“employed.”  If employment opportunities existed in poor countries like Pakistan 
some of the sons would not join the jihad. In fact, this woman was able to find jobs 
for 79 men, who are now happily employed in non-militant pursuits.   
There are situations that call for violence. The so called Arab spring 
provided opportunities to “professional jihadists” to find employment. For instance, 
in the beginning of the Syrian uprising there were no jihadists, but after a few 
months Iraqi jihadist came into Syria to try their hand in overthrowing the regime.  
Triandis (2009b) reported that there are militants who realize that their bosses are 
directing militant operations in order to obtain large salaries (in some cases, of the 
order of $100,000 per year), and though the militants wish to stop working for 
them, they are afraid of being killed if they defect. Thus, in some cases jihad is a 
“lucrative business.” 
Sacred values are especially important in inspiring jihadists (Ginges, Atran, 
Sachdeva, and Medin, 2011). When such values are activated people are likely to 
buy into a cause that glorifies self-sacrificing violence for “the greater good.” 
Bashiriyeh (2011), found the greatest violence in Islamic countries, less in 
mid-Africa, even less in Eastern Europe, a moderate amount of violence was found 
in the USA, considerably less in New Zealand and Europe; finally minimal violence 
was found in Scandinavia. This agrees with the hypothesis, that VC to HI cultures 
reflect a slope of decreasing violence across cultures. Generally countries that 
were collectivist and high in hierarchy had more violence than countries that were 
individualist and high in equality.  Individualist countries are more affluent that 
collectivist countries, so there was also less homicide in wealthy than in poor 
countries. 
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Another factor that may increase violence in Islam is polygamy. When some 
men have four wives others may have none. Males are more aggressive than 
females (Pinker, 2011), especially those age 15-30.  When their marital prospects 
are blocked, and individuals are told about the wonders of paradise if they are 
killed for Allah, jihad may become very attractive.  
Empirical research shows that hot periods of the year account for more 
violence than cool ones (Pinker, 2011). Much of Islam is in the hot parts of the 
world, so that is one more factors that may account for the high rates of violence. 
Finally, emphasis on Human Rights is related to low violence, but, as discussed 
above, many Muslims reject the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Allawi 
(2009) rejects it because the Declaration states that individuals should be free to 
enter or leave any religion of their choice. That he states is totally unacceptable in 
Islam, since leaving Islam is apostasy and is punishable by death.   
Another factor is the importance that most Islam gives to conquest. When 
asked to identify the best period of Islam many Muslims mention the period when 
Islam expanded into North Africa, Spain and the Balkans (Gabriel, 2006; Triandis, 
2009b). That was defined as “the Golden Period of Islam.” Yet that was an 
extraordinarily violent period in Islam (Gabriel, 2006). For example, Abu-Bakr, the 
immediate successor of Muhammad, killed 84,000 Muslims because they refused 
to pay the 10 percent tax, as required by Islam. By today’s standards, this “Rightly 
Guided Caliph” (as Muslims call him) was a war criminal guilty of genocide. 
Another clue comes from the research of Ginges, Hansen, & Norenzayan 
(2009). They found that individuals who went to the mosque very regularly were 
more likely to approve of suicide attacks than those who mostly prayed at home.  It 
maybe that in mosques they encounter more fundamentalist belief systems, but it 
may also be an aspect of their personality.  We might eventually develop both 
demographic and personality tests predicting violence. 
Still another clue is provided by a study by Bushman, Ridge, Das, Key & 
Buasath (2007). People who read from the Bible, that God sanctions aggression, 
were more aggressive than those in a control group. The authors concluded that 
“scriptural violence sanctioned by God can increase aggression, especially among 
believers" (p. 204). 
In sum the more religious, cognitively simple individuals are more likely to be 
in the one percent than in the ninety-nine percent group, and those who have many 
cognitively simple self-deceptions, and are exposed to sacred texts that advocate 
violence and frequently attend religious services may be more violent. 
 
 
The Instigators of Violence 
In addition to the jihadists who carry out the violence, there are imams, and 
the leaders of al-Qaeda and similar organizations who instigate violence. These 
are smart, well educated, and cognitively complex individuals, who are interested 
in power, and use religion as a cover to legitimize the violence (Triandis, 2009b). In 
most cultures individuals who are just interested in power are unpopular, but when 
they appear to the general public as pious workers for Allah they are well liked. 
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Imams advocating violence sometimes emerge as leaders of the Muslim 
congregation. However, different versions of Islam have different views about 
Imams. The Sunni Imams are simply emergent leaders. The Shiah imams are 
more special since they are believed to be chosen by God. The training of Imams 
has not been formalized. For example, there is no evidence that it includes a 
course in comparative religions, which is often found in the curricula of seminaries. 
In Germany and Austria there have been training and certification efforts, but in 
other countries this has not happened yet. Professors Rauf Ceylan of the 
University of Osnabrὕck, and Christine Langenfeld of the Georg-August University 
in Gὄttingen have been the leaders in this endeavor.  It is likely that training that is 
totally Islamocentric will result in prejudice toward other religions, and may be a 
component in increased violence. 
 
 
The Positive Aspects of Religion 
Religion provides experiences that people find invaluable. People might 
have mystical experiences that make them feel sure that something “real” exists “in 
heaven.” But such experiences can be created also with the electrical stimulation 
of the brain. Newberg, D’Aquili, & Rause, (2001) used single photon emission 
computerized tomography of the brain during the meditation of their patients, and 
found that the boundary between  the brain areas that are activated when “self” 
and “not self” are perceived becomes blurred during meditation. So, the individual 
sees the self immersed in the infinite. The same measurements were taken during 
intense prayer. The area of the brain that is involved in the weakening of the self-
not self boundary is the area which, when injured, results in the patient’s inability to 
lie down in bed, because the patient does not know where the body ends and the 
bed begins.  
Rhythm is important in religion and rituals, and of course also in music and 
dance. Animals also have rituals, so that rituals have deep evolutionary roots.  In 
animals, rituals permit communication, and recognition that the other animal is a 
friend.  Neewberg and his co-authors describe the complex mating rituals of 
butterflies, such as males flying around females brushing their wings. Both the 
male and female do behave in complex ways before they mate.  
Religious experiences involve the same neurological structures as sex, and 
that is why there is rhythm in both systems (during intercourse and in religious 
ecstasy).  Rhythm and repetition are the essential elements of ritual.  
In humans, rituals generate emotional discharges such as tranquility, 
ecstasy, and spiritual transcendence. Participation in spiritual activities reduces 
blood pressure, lowers rates of respiration, increases cortisol levels, and improves 
the immune system (Newberg et al., p.86).  In Sufi dancing arousal is intense. 
Activation of the orientation area of the brain leads to a sense of no separation 
between “self” and “not-self.” In mysticism there is contact with the Absolute, and 
with the intensely loved one. Mystical experiences are the source of all religion. For 
those who are not religious, great art, such as great music, e.g., Bach, Beethoven, 
can provide the ecstasies that are normally provided by religion. 
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Religion reduces uncertainty, improves health, and is especially good for our 
mental health (Triandis, 2009b). The experience of something larger than 
ourselves is what Einstein called the “cosmic religious feeling.” It is the experience 
of the universe as a single significant whole (Newberg et al., p.154).  Triandis 
(2009b) argues that humans need a goal that is greater than themselves. To treat 
all humanity as brothers and sisters is an immense goal. But religions have a 
negative side as well. They are not only associated with violence but also with guilt. 
Counseling psychologist Ray (2009) described how many of his patients feel guilty 
because sexual behavior that is perfectly normal is considered “a sin” in their 
religion. 
Religion helps people deal with uncertainty, and with dangerous, 
unpredictable situations (Barber, 2011). Barber showed that in most cultures the 
more predictable the environment (economic, health) the less emphasis is given to 
religion. In a study of 137 cultures disbelief in God was higher when there was 
economic and health security. Thus the current emphasis on religion in American 
politics may be a reflection of the economic crisis. We can predict that Greeks will 
become extremely religious in the next ten years. 
 
 
Religions Become More Violent When They Are Under Attack 
Consider one of the more famous cases of religious violence. During the 
night of St. Bartholomew in 1572, 50,000 to 100,000 Protestants were killed by 
French Catholics. Some of the Catholics had a “mystical experience, a moment 
akin to resurrection, in which they came closer to God” (Carroll, 2009).  Violence is 
especially likely when a religion feels under attack. Catholics felt under attack by 
Protestants; all religions now feel under attack by modernity (science, technology, 
emphasis on reason; de-emphasis of customs and faith, of traditional authority and 
of embeddedness in nature, as found among American Indians). Some parts of 
Islam are especially defensive about modernity.  Modernity is inconsistent with the 
attributes of much of current Islam, though 12th century Islam was consistent with 
the modernity of that time.  In the 20th century there have been movements toward 
modernity in Islam, such as Kemal Atatürk in Turkey and others (Esposito, 2003), 
but on the whole Islam feels defensive and also rejected by the West. The 
existence of blasphemy laws, such as those found in Pakistan, suggests that in 
some parts of Islam people feel that their religion is extremely weak and needs 
protection. 
The problem with the rejection of traditional Islam, as found in the Turkey of 
the 1920s, is that it involved a culture becoming more like the West—more 
complex, loose, individualistic, and horizontal. That means loss of some of the 
traditional elements of the culture, i. e., those elements that people find 
“comfortable” and also the elements that define who they are in unique ways. Such 
changes can easily “disorient” people and that may have implications for their 
mental health. On the other hand, economic development divorced from global 
markets is rare. Thus, there is a serious dilemma. Muslims might ask: should we 
risk our mental health or remain poor? 
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In any case the current relationship between the global world and Islam is 
unsatisfactory. The West rejects or is unfriendly to Islam and Islam rejects and at 
times is violent toward the West. Eisenberger (2011) discovered that social 
rejection activates the same parts of the brain as physical pain. Thus, for instance, 
in careful experiments, Tylenol reduced the feelings associated with social 
rejection. In most mammals physical pain results in aggression. We can 
extrapolate that when Islam feels rejected (e.g., the Rushdie affair, the Danish 
cartoons, the issue of a French satirical magazine who used Mohammed as the 
“editor” with instructions to the reader to “die laughing”) it becomes more violent. 
One of the clearest cases of Islam under attack by modernity and science is 
found in Nigeria.  The Boko Haram (it means Western education is sinful) sect of 
Islam objects to all forms of Western education, and insists that the whole of 
Nigeria (a country whose South is Christian) should adopt Shariah law. Again this 
is a totally Islamocentric perspective. Clearly they advocate escape from 
modernity, e.g., science. If science is “sinful” that part of the world is condemned to 
remain poor. The conflict between Islam and science is described by Allawi (2009) 
in detail. He seems to favor the view that there are two kinds of knowledge: 
permanent (derived from God) and changeable (derived from science). He favors 
the permanent.  
The advantage of changeable knowledge, i.e., based on science, is that we 
expect it to change as new data come in or hypotheses are falsified. The 
disadvantage of permanent knowledge is that any criticism that challenges any 
aspect of it instigates an enormously emotional reaction, as occurred when 
Muhammad’s image was presented in the Danish cartoons, or the Qur’an was 
burned by mistake in Afghanistan, in 2012, resulting in riots, much violence, and 
the death of several people.     
Gabriel (2006) mentions that some Egyptian jihadists stopped violence 
when they realized that violence increases resistance to Islam. We need to stress 
that violence has made the life of Muslims in the West much more uncomfortable, 
and reduced the chances that Shariah law will be accepted world-wide. Few 
people around the world in the 21st century want to see adulterous women stoned, 
execution for apostasy or blasphemy, thieves having their hands cut off, the 
elimination of usury, the prohibition of alcohol and the like. The world is no longer 
tolerant of many aspects of Shariah law. The dream of the jihadists that they can 
impose Shariah law on the world is a wild fantasy. It assumes that the world is in 
the 7th rather than in a global 21st century. It shows their ignorance and self-
deception, i.e., lack of realistic thinking. 
 
 
Is there a Way to De-escalate Violence in Islam? 
Most human prefer peace to violence. Most Muslims are embarrassed by 
the violence of the 1 percent, but are too timid to object (Gabriel, 2006). Since 
religion is so valuable to most people it is unrealistic to try to make Muslims less 
religious. However, it may be feasible to move them away from their sacred books, 
to more secular viewpoints. The view that Shania law is God’s instructions to 
humans can be challenged. The Qur’an is not God’s word, but the product of a 
Acta de Investigación Psicológica 983 
 
great poet—Muhammad (Triandis, 2009b). Psychologists have many clients who 
have visions, but those who are not religious attribute their visions to non-religious 
factors.  Muhammad was very religious and it was natural that he interpreted his 
visions as coming from God, but the facts are different.  
Triandis (2009b) discusses the Qur’an as the product of self-deception in 
detail. It certainly fits the hopes needs and desires of people that they have a 
perfect blueprint for living. But the text was based on “revelations” that reflected 
simply the circumstances of Muhammad’s life.  The suras (sections) that were 
inspired in Mecca were peaceful; that was the period when the religion was new 
and Muhammad had to convince his followers that it was a religion of peace. The 
suras that were inspired in Medina are belligerent, and advocated killing the non-
believers.  That was the period when he was fighting the non-believers.  
Triandis (2009b) discusses several other episodes in Muhammad’s life 
which indicate that the revelations were reflections of his life-events rather than 
inspired by God. The Prophet was illiterate, so he employed scribes to record his 
revelations. One of these scribes altered what Muhammad had said to see if God 
would get upset. Nothing happened! Then the scribe concluded that He was not 
involved in the revelations, so he quit his job and went to another town. On one 
occasion Muhammad’s followers raided a caravan on the wrong date. Mohammad 
was upset. But then he had a revelation that it was alright to raid that caravan. His 
wife A’isha said to him: “truly thy Lord makes haste to do thy bidding…” 
(Armstrong, 2006, p.168). In short, we can trace the Qur’an to events in 
Muhammad’s life. Of course, those who are inclined to attribute events to 
supernatural factors will continue to believe that God was involved, but that is not 
necessary for those who are realists.  
In short, we need to convince members of Islam that the Qur’an is a 
valuable work of poetry from one of the world’s greatest poets, but its content is 
human-made, just as are all the sacred books of all religions, and while it was a 
fine guide for the good life in the 7th century it is not so in the 21st. A serious 
problem with this proposal is that dogmatic people reject any suggestion that their 
sacred text is just like all the other sacred texts. A person who takes this position is 
automatically called an apostate, a blasphemer. That indicates the difficulty that 
most Muslims experience if they are to have unconventional beliefs.  
In Islam there is the assumption that the Qur’an is the “word of God.” That, 
of course, assumes that there is a God. But modern science questions that 
hypothesis. Cosmologists (Hawking & Mlodinow, 2010) agree with La Place, who 
when he asked by Napoleon “Where is God in your description of the universe?” 
answered: “Sire, I do not need this hypothesis.” Current research in physics 
explores the existence of multiple universes. It is a very different vision from the 
view that prevailed when the religions of the book were created.  
Every force produces a counter-force. If we are to de-escalate violence we 
need to stop ridiculing and show more respect for Islam. At the same time Islam 
has to convince its 1 percent that what they are doing reduces the respect that the 
majority of the world population feels toward Islam, and in fact is so counter-
productive that it might destroy Islam in the long run. 
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Thus, to decrease Islamic violence it may be wise to accept that some of the 
violence is due to what was done by the West (e.g., colonialism) and also to show 
less rejection and use no ridicule of Islam. At the same time it is necessary to push 
members of Islam toward a more realistic appraisal of the 21st Century, the Qur’an, 
and to an increased understanding of science and the role of globalization and 
modernity. 
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